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Abstract. Successful water sharing negotiations
require the application of five Guiding Principles: an
obligation to cooperate and negotiate in good faith; a
commitment to interdisciplinary analysis; analysis
conducted at the watershed and river basin scale; a
commitment to adaptability; and adherence to certain
standards in the negotiations.
Development of an effective water sharing
agreement requires accurate and precise information
that enables: determination of the geographical and
political boundaries of the water sources to be shared;
identification of the water policies, laws and
regulations of the individual Parties that may conflict;
the prediction of the future availability of water and its
quality; and prediction of the future demands for water
that must be met. With this information, alternative
effective mechanisms or strategies for the allocation
can be developed,
The final step in effective water sharing is
producing a document that expresses the rights,
privileges and obligations of the Parties as well as
providing a mechanism to administer the water sharing.
Model Water Sharing Agreements for the 21st Century
(Draper, 2002) provides three model water sharing
agreements to serve as a template for individual
agreements.
INTRODUCTION
Water scarcity is evident throughout much of the
United States, and the use of shared water resources is a
major source of conflict.  The interstate and international
conflicts over the allocation of the waters of the
Colorado River began early in the Twentieth Century
and have yet to be totally resolved. Even when water is
relatively plentiful, the increasing demand for water
from shared resources is growing as the population
expands, dramatically increasing the needs of public
water supply. This is graphically demonstrated by the
dispute between Florida, Alabama and Georgia over
allocation of the shared waters.  The problem is
pervasive. Few river basins in the continental United
States are contained within a single state’s boundaries.
The problem is magnified in the international
arena.  There are 268 major rivers shared between and
among two or more nations. These international rivers
cover almost one half of the total land surface of the
globe. Fifty-three rivers are shared by three or more
nations, with the Danube being shared by 17 riparian
countries.  International river basins sustain over 40% of
the world’s population. Over a third of the 200
international river basins are not covered by any
international agreement, and only some 30 have truly
co-operative institutional arrangements.  The need for
effective co-operation among riparian countries is
greater now than ever before because of the growing
demand for water.
OBSTACLES  TO   WATER  SHARING
Successful water sharing must overcome a number
of significant obstacles.  The reluctance to give up
dominion and control over the natural resources within
the political boundaries of the Parties is arguably the
most significant. (Draper, 2002; Puri, 2002; Wolf, 2001;
World Bank, 1998; Libiszewski, 1995)  Other obstacles
to effective water sharing include conflicts in the
internal water laws and policies of the Parties, an
incomplete knowledge of both the water resource
availability and demand for water within the shared
basin, and conflicts between the internal economic
policies of the Parties
Whether it is a nation-state or a state or tribal entity
within a federal system, a government will normally
claim the exclusive rights to all natural resources within
its boundaries, including ownership and/or control of the
water resources. (Albert, 2000; Draper, 1997)  In
negotiations, each Party will seek the rights and
authorities critical to its political, economic or social
objectives while ceding less critical rights and
authorities to the other nations.  Water sharing requires
each Party to relinquish a part of its control and
dominion.  Resolution of this inherent friction underlies
the success of all negotiations. How much sovereignty is
relinquished determines the scope and possibly the
effectiveness of the agreement. (Eaux partagées, 2002)
In the United State, three elements of control and
dominion clash under the constitutional powers of the
federal, state and tribal governments. Under federalism,
the states maintain control over inland waters, with some
important exceptions.  (Gelt, 1997; Kennedy and Lord,
1994; Kansas v. Colorado) These important exceptions
include specific legislation, such as the Clean Water Act
as well as certain doctrines established by the Supreme
Court and by Congressional deference.  Such doctrines
include federal reserved water rights that adhere to
federal lands in the west, federal control over
navigability, and federal supremacy regarding federal
waterpower projects.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The uniqueness of each basin and its riparian states
indicates that a universal set of principles must be fairly
general.  (Wolfe, 1999)  However, efficient and
effective transboundary water sharing should be based
on five guiding principles.
Coordination and cooperation
All Parties have a duty to cooperate and negotiate
in good faith. This principle is the foundation of
international law, and it applies in all relations between
sovereign nations. (Draper, 1997)
Interdisciplinary Analysis
The development of effective and efficient water
sharing is a multi-faceted challenge. (Draper, 2001;
Kenney and Lord, 1994)  Although necessarily based
on water science, i.e., knowledge of the quantity,
quality and timing of the available water supplies, the
development of effective water sharing agreements is
predicated on an adequate interdisciplinary analysis by
experts in water science, engineering, technology, law,
and economics. (Dellapenna and Draper, 2002)
Watershed and River Basin Management
Planning and management on a watershed or river
basin basis, not solely according to artificial political
boundaries should be foundation principle for both
intrastate and interstate water management. (Barlow
and Clarke, 2002) The reality of political boundaries
and the desire for local control must be respected in the
water sharing process, but effective and efficient water
sharing requires analysis by watershed.
Adaptability
The water sharing agreement should be based on
the best information available, but should be flexible
enough for change. Natural systems are inherently
variable and complex.  (Sophocleous, 1998)  An
adaptive agreement is designed from the outset to
recognize that clearly formulated predictions about the
behavior of hydrologic systems may being changed by
human use (Lee, 1993) as well as by the potential
effects of climate change. (IPCC, 2001)  For an
agreement on water sharing to be effective, it must be
prepared to adapt to potential changes in site-specific
circumstances that may develop within time-period the
agreement is in effect. (Bernauer, 2001)
Principles of Negotiation
Certain principles of negotiations are essential for
the development and implementation of a viable water
sharing agreement.  These principles are equally
necessary for the agreement's ongoing effectiveness.
They include an obligation to cooperate and negotiate
in good faith and an obligation to prevent unreasonable
harm to other Parties. Other principles of negotiations
include a commitment to the equitable utilization of the
shared water, an obligation to exchange adequate data
with the other Parties and a commitment to the values
of water resource sustainability. (Dellapenna, 2001;
Albert, 2000; Caponera, 1995; Draper, 1997; Hey,
1995)
ASSESSMENTS
An effective water sharing agreement requires
precise information about the availability and quality of
water and the demands that must be accommodated. An
accurate accounting for existing demands and one for
predicting future water demands must be made, as well
as an assessment of the water quality and quantity
necessary for ecological integrity.   A number of other
assessments should be conducted at the beginning of
the formulation of the agreement.  These include
definition of the geographical and political boundaries
of the water sources to be shared and analysis of the
water policies, laws and regulations of the individual
Parties that may conflict. An economic impact analysis
should be made that correlates the other assessments.
From a procedural standpoint, strategies for the
development of a water sharing agreement should
initially proceed with the exchange of data and
information between technical experts with the
objective of reaching a technical  consensus on both the
actual and potential problems regarding water sharing.
Only then can alternative strategies to respond to the
problems be developed.  (Eaux partagées, 2002)  The
assessment process constructs a factual background that
will enable the implementation of a strategy of water
allocation.
Once the Parties have quantified the water sources
and demands, including the environmental
sustainability needs, the economic impact assessment
of the various strategies can then be used to make
tradeoffs according to some objective function agreed
to by the Parties.  Analysts should develop an
allocation strategy that best fits the objectives set by the
Parties.
STRATEGIES
Although the variation among allocation strategies
is infinite, historical experience has demonstrated that
the number of successful strategies is limited.  History
has also demonstrated distinct allocation strategies that
apply to allocating surface water and groundwater. The
allocation should apportion the water justly and fairly
and should minimize the potential for conflict. (Draper,
1997) Although the specific manner of allocating water
can vary according to a variety of influences, most can
be classified as either flow or storage allocation.
Choice of the method depends on what the Parties want
to accomplish and how they want to divide the risk of
shortage. (McCormick, 1994)
Historically, six strategies for surface water
allocation have been used. (Draper, 1997; McCormick,
1994; Dumars, 1990) A priority of particular demand
strategy sets priorities by the type of use rather than by
user location and provides certain quantitative
limitations on those priorities. Storage Limitations limit
the amount of water that an upstream entity may
impound on an annual or seasonal basis. It may be
combined with some other method of allocation. Using
guaranteed quantity at a point, a guaranteed quantity is
to be delivered at certain points. The upstream Party
guarantees that a fixed amount of water will pass a
certain point every year or other time period.  Using a
percentage of flow strategy the Parties allocate water
by either a fixed percentage or a formula based on
different flow levels.  Each participant is entitled to
take its specified percentage of the total yield of the
basin. A consumption limitation strategy allocates a
particular delivery requirement between one point and
another, as was done in the Rio Grande Compact.
Historically, two strategies for groundwater
allocation have been used. (Cherry and Badr, 1998;
Hayton and Utton, 1989) A Maximum withdrawal rate
strategy does not divide the water itself, but limits the
Parties’ rates of extraction. Planned Depletion is used
in a case where recharge is limited or nonexistent. The
Parties agree that the groundwater source is a
nonrenewable resource and the aquifer is divided in
terms of total withdrawal over a period of time.
There is a growing consensus that water sharing
agreements should consciously allocate benefits as well
as allocating water. (World Commission on Dams,
2000) Normally, however, economic benefits are not
explicitly used in allocating water, although economic
principles have helped guide definitions of "beneficial"
uses and have suggested "baskets" of benefits,
including both water and non-water resources, for
positive-sum solution.  (Hamner and Wolf, 1998)
MODEL WATER SHARING AGREEMENTS
The final step in effective water sharing is
producing a document that expresses the rights,
privileges and obligations of the Parties as well as
providing a mechanism to administer the water sharing.
To assist in developing such a document, model water
sharing agreements have been published to serve as a
template. Model Water Sharing Agreements for the 21st
Century (Draper, 2002) provides three model water
sharing agreements to serve as a framework for
individual agreements.  These agreements are
structured according to the willingness of the Parties to
accede to the principles outlined above and the degree
of sovereignty over water resources the Parties are
willing to renounce in order to make transboundary
water use efficient.
The Model Agreement for Coordination and
Cooperation simply facilitates the exchange of data and
other information pertinent to independent water
planning and development by the respective Parties.
The Parties retain almost all of their sovereignty over
the water within their boundaries.  The Limited
Purpose Agreement is designed for those situations in
which the Parties wish to maintain control of most
aspects of their internal water development but
recognize either the need to resolve existing or
potential conflict or the need to establish direct
coordination or management over a specific water
development project, a particular water source, or a
particular water management function. The
Comprehensive Water Management Agreement
provides a model for comprehensive planning and
management of shared water resources.  This Model
Agreement is based on the concept that the most
efficient and effective allocation of shared water
resources can be achieved only through management
on a watershed basis and that the water resources and
the associated riparian lands are an integrated whole
whose interrelation requires integrated management to
achieve optimal use especially during periods of
drought.
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